Epistemic creativity as a key to positive development in Africa

Prof. Dr. Joseph C. A. Agbakoba, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Nigeria, has been awarded a Georg Forster Research Award by the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation in appreciation of his academic work to date. Until 2024 he will be researching the philosophical, ethical and intercultural foundations of development in Africa at the Institute of Philosophy at the University of Bayreuth. In the following, he gives insights into his philosophical ideas and his transcolonial approach to modern conceptions of Africa's future.

Are there philosophical directions at African universities today that are considered to be particularly innovative and groundbreaking?

The direct answer is yes. This new philosophical approach is about an independent African response to the experiences and the reality of life of the people in Africa. It confronts the epistemic challenges that arise when one draws on different resources of knowledge and interconnects those aspects which, on closer examination, could prove to be true and functional.

Which knowledge resources are particularly relevant for Africa in this context?

The main resources are pre-colonial indigenous knowledge, colonial heritage including modernity, but also new and globally available knowledge resources. The innovative philosophical approach I am talking about here does not conceive of indigenous, colonial and global resources as fixed self-contained knowledge systems, but works towards a creative interconnection of these resources. It avoids essentialist notions that there is an unchanging 'essence' of African identity. In this respect, the new approach is constructivist and at the same time transcolonial – focusing on transcending the limitations of the colonial and precolonial heritages. Aspects of interculturality, hybridity and epistemic creativity thus move into the focus of philosophical attention and research.

What insights does this approach provide?

First of all, it makes us realise that there are two main sources of identity for the people of Africa: historical heritage and self-manifestation through epistemic creativity that allows for a new design of one's own identity. It is this creativity that we can and should draw on in Africa's development, since historical heritage is problematic as a result of colonialism. The new transcolonial and constructivist approach encourages us not to be fixated with the supposedly ready-made, historically and culturally defined identities but instead emphasizes our freedom, self-empowerment to act on our own, and our own responsibility.

This approach to Africa's development is not least a therapy for the African psyche, which has been wounded by colonialism. It also means that modern African studies no longer see themselves as "protest scholarship", as the Nigerian writer Chinua Achebe called it. Protest scholarship produces critique and negative knowledge – that is, information about what is not the case despite contrary and historically dominant claims. Important as this may be, in African studies we should mainly focus on the production of positive knowledge and bring new insights about reality to bear on Africa's future development.

Can such an orientation of African studies promote a positive African self-image?

Yes, this is exactly what the philosophical approach I have outlined does: It promotes a positively tuned creativity in the production of knowledge and strengthens the associated processes of identity formation.

How do you assess the influence of philosophy on public debates or political processes in Africa? Does philosophy have a voice that is heard in public?

Whether or not the voice of philosophers is heard in public debate depends very much on the extent to which their engagement corresponds to the interests of the public. African intellectuals attracted a lot of attention during the period of anti-colonial resistance and the struggle for state independence. They were virtually leaders of this struggle, which was – to use an expression of the philosopher Isaiah Berlin – a struggle for negative freedom, for freedom from the constraints imposed mainly from the outside. This commitment coincided with the interests of the public and was accompanied by a concern for African identity that had been violated and endangered by colonial racism. With the achievement of independence, this struggle for negative freedom transformed into the pursuit of positive freedom: a freedom that comes with the development of expanded and new capabilities. The Indian philosopher and economist Amartya Sen is right when he sees development as freedom in this context. To achieve freedom, we need positive knowledge rooted in the African public interest and – related to this – social inclusion, peace, science and technology, and development-oriented good governance.

Has "protest scholarship", which emerged from anti-colonial resistance, become obsolete?

In many respects, it is still the dominant approach in Africa today, especially in African studies. However, the associated identitarian concern and the one-dimensional focus on the colonially shaped Other, from whom it is necessary to distinguish oneself, are proving to be less than productive. Thus, many African intellectuals have disconnected themselves from the people and their actual everyday needs. In this respect, too, the transcolonial approach is a corrective. The reactions that I myself and others receive when we speak out for this new creativity-oriented approach at universities and other fora are very encouraging.

What is the significance of decolonisation in philosophical debates in Africa?

Many African philosophers today are tired of the decolonisation debate and its focus on the "malignant other". A recent book by the philosopher and political theorist Olufemi Taiwo entitled "Against Decolonisation" is an expression of this dissatisfaction. We have become painfully aware that the failure of African development in the last six decades and even before that was to a large extent a consequence of the failure of African agency. We had spaces for development and resources that could have been used to make our societies much, much better than they are today, but they were squandered by terrible leaderships. Nevertheless, there is still a public in Africa today that supports and encourages these ruling classes. The Nigerian sociologist Peter Ekeh tried to capture this phenomenon with his concept of the two African publics. We live in a social constellation in which a person would be punished by his family, clan or ethnic group – i.e. within the original informal public – if he does not corrupt the established public sector in his and their favour. Those who take full advantage of these opportunities for corruption for their own benefit are considered saints in the domestic community, but they are considered villains in the legally constituted national or regional community. People therefore do little in their own living environment to control abuses of power. In addition, the means developed in traditional societies to control abuse of power are not effective any longer in the modern public sector.

What repercussions do these experiences have for the concept of decolonisation?

The problems just outlined have made it clear to people in Africa, especially in West Africa, that our problem is the "enemy within", as the common saying goes. People realise that political decolonisation, which was a moral imperative and the goal of a worthwhile resistance struggle, has not delivered on its promises, although state independence has been achieved. The economic decolonisation that followed, involving Africanisation and expropriation of foreign companies, failed even more miserably: money and resources ended up in corrupt, incompetent private hands and were squandered. Meanwhile, many people are so disgusted by the failure of decolonisation and the role of African leaders that they are calling for recolonisation. I myself consider this call to be absolutely misguided, but some intellectuals support it. They like the order and efficiency of the colonial era but do not see the big moral, political and social problems and have no real arguments why a revival of colonial conditions should be a panacea instead of leading to an even greater catastrophe.

Isn't the opposite thesis also being put forward, that decolonisation is far from complete and must be consistently deepened in culture and science, for example?

Yes, in the meantime numerous intellectuals, also in the field of philosophy, are calling for a thorough decolonisation of African mental attitudes and knowledge systems. But many who adopt this demand are not aware of the consequences: a consistent implementation would mean abandoning the ratio-scientific epistemic orientation of the West – and thus rejecting the knowledge and competences that have enabled the West to colonise the rest of the world. A radical rejection of the West's knowledge systems, however, would be linked to a return to a mindset that had weakened many peoples of the Global South and increased their vulnerability. This would not be a sensible option for Africa, so long as better alternatives to a rational and scientific orientation are out of sight.

Is this not a very radical interpretation of the demand for a "decolonisation of the mind"?

Some intellectuals who advocate decolonisation would indeed object that they do not have a radical anti-Western programme of this type in mind. What is needed, in their view, is a kind of moderate decolonisation in which we retain, on a case-by-case basis, what is useful in our colonial heritage and discard everything that is useless or harmful. Such moderate decolonisation, however, lacks a rational basis that provides us with a well-reasoned criteria for selecting what is useful and discarding what is useless. This is exactly what a philosophy of development for the African continent should be able to do. It should be able to present rational arguments and explanations, relate them systematically to each other and reflect on them self-critically. At the same time, it should contribute to more clarity in fundamental questions – in particular, with regard to the dimensions and goals of development in Africa and the associated designs of identity. In this respect, the idea of moderate decolonisation has intellectual weaknesses.

Do you consider the historically undoubtedly meritorious and necessary concept of decolonisation to be inadequate when it comes to development issues today?

It certainly remains unsatisfactory in many respects. As far as I can see, many advocates of decolonisation are stuck in a traditionalist essentialism. They have a static image of African identity and therefore do not allow enough creative freedom in the realisation of development goals. The transcolonial approach described above is a better, sustainable development philosophy for Africa. It creates the necessary intellectual space for dealing with fundamental issues of the future. This includes new concepts for dealing with injustice in international relations.

What role does a universalistic self-understanding of philosophy influenced by the "European Enlightenment" play in the context of this debate?

Some African representatives of decolonisation today are guided by views that run counter to a universalist understanding of science and philosophy. They tend – to summarise – towards traditionalism, nativism, unnecessary essentialism and relativism. I myself and other philosophers in Africa disagree with this attitude. The relativist understanding of logic, truth and knowledge stems from the inability or refusal to distinguish logical laws from concrete thought processes of individual persons. Universality and intersubjectivity are often flatly denied because the conditions for the validity of statements are not distinguished from the contingent conditions under which they were made. Self-contradictions, divisions and isolation are the consequences. Decolonisation and its foundations are thus – as soon as we begin to understand it as a radical ideology, as decoloniality for instance, and no longer as an instrument for regaining political, juridical freedom and sovereignty – the wrong cure for a social disease.

What do you mean by this?

The relations of domination shaped by colonialism and their effects on the colonised and the colonisers can be well conceived as a social disease. Decolonisation as an ideology runs the risk of solidifying these effects. Instead of helping the formerly colonised to combat the effects of colonialism in thought and action, it undermines the self-empowerment required for this. Moreover, it can fuel negative emotions and attitudes, such as anger, hatred and low self-esteem. What is needed in this context, by the way, is self-examination on all sides, because at its core, colonial structures of ruling and being ruled are a universal phenomenon: countries in Africa, Asia and the Americas had their own empires and built their own colonial structures until they themselves were colonised. Some of them are still struggling to preserve their supremacy. The colonial attitude is therefore a human problem that needs to be addressed as such.

Especially recently, isn't it also about concrete political and legal issues, for example compensation for colonised and enslaved people in Africa?

Yes, of course. However, in debates about compensating for the impact of colonisation and about aid for rebuilding African societies, it does not help the former colonisers very much when they proceed beyond the pragmatic fields of restoration and follow ideologically fixed concepts of decolonisation. The decolonial approach also has no real therapeutic value if it causes the former colonisers – to put it bluntly – to "self-immolate". In a way, colonisation on the one side and decolonisation, pursued as an ideological programme, on the other side can both have negative effects that are similar in some respects: paralysis of agency, weakening of positive creativity, undermining of values underlying human productivity, mistrust, nervousness, social division and lack of intercultural exchange.
In this context, I have to say that certain aspects of the Enlightenment were not helpful. Decolonisation as an ideology is a descendant of the Kantian view that conflict is the main driver of social development. Some of the foundations of this theory passed on to Hegel, and then transferred via Marx and critical theorists to contemporary theorists of decolonisation. But it is precisely the experience of many developing countries in the Global South that shows: harmony is a better basis for the development of societies and states than conflict. The success of the formerly colonised countries in Asia and some countries in Africa, especially Botswana, is to a large extent due to this. Philosophical ideas on harmony in social relations are traditionally rooted in African and Asian thought.

Do you want to tie in with this in your own philosophical work?

Yes, during my time at the University of Bayreuth, I will explore these traditional connections in more detail. In doing so, it is very important to me to link them with proposals for solving social and ecological questions and with considerations on reshaping international relations. I want to work towards a concordance theory of development that does better justice to the conditions of development in the global South. At the centre of my reflections is the concept of a positive practical justice based on social harmony and balancing social differences. Crucial to this are the will for reconciliation, respect and mutual appreciation, investment in education and development resources, freedom and a common orientation towards human well-being – while at the same time there could be diverse possible paths leading towards these goals. Retribution, punishment and other forms of inflicting pain are certainly not the preferred means of promoting the common good. This is abundantly clear from the colonial and post-colonial history of many countries in the Global South.